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Abstract
We give an apparently new possible explanation for why there might be something rather than nothing
—the weakest assumptions coupled with a kind of perspectivalism. Within a Fragmentalist 
interpretation of quantum mechanics (each quantum mechanics system forms a fragment), McTaggart’s
A-series of time has this kind of perspectivalism. We then use the A-series and the B-series to 
differentiate between how far in the past the big bang was vs. how much earlier than now the big bang 
was. In one example model, the former goes to infinity while the latter stays finite. This implies the 
number of quantum interactions per unit 4-volume goes up to infinity as we approach the big bang 
from the present epoch.
Without further ado, consider
1. Two why-is-there-something-rather-than-nothing questions.
More specifically, the questions (1.1) and (1.2) below are two different questions:
1.1 why is there something rather than nothing?
1.1.1 we could be asking for logical or temporal or causal (or something else) reasons—take your pick
1.1.2 on one end of a spectrum we have that every logically possible (or, more generally, qualitatively 
possible) thing exists. On the other end of the spectrum we have that only this (indeed solipsistic) 
universe exists. (Two semantic dimensions.)
1.1.3 (1.1) seems insoluble, but ontic perspectivalism is a possible solution. We may suppose each state
has a prior state, but, as Leibniz pointed out, there is then the question of where the whole sequence of 
states came from. But in ontic perspectivalism there is no perspective from which the whole sequence 
of states can be surveyed, so the sequence taken as a whole does not need an explanation. But this is 
exactly the behavior of the A-series (defined below).
1.2 what state of affairs requires the fewest (weakest) assumptions?
1.2.1 is the existence of the possibility of some state of affairs x a weaker assumption than the 
assumption that the possibility does not exist? This might be the case because the requirement that 
there is ‘nothing’ seems to itself be an assumption.
1.2.2 if we admit the existence of a possibility we have a toe-hold on existence and it might be possible 
to bootstrap from there.
1.2.3 In view of (1.2) an interesting answer to question (1.1) is: why not?
2. McTaggart (1908) pointed out that two series characterize one dimension of time:
2.1 the A-series (which we’ll take to be): future-present-past.
2.2 the B-series: earlier-times to later times.
It is usually supposed that the A-series values change, while the B-series values do not change on time-
like worldlines.
In the fragmentalist interpretation of quantum mechanics of (Merriaim 2019) each quantum system 
forms a fragment, and each fragment has its own distinct A-series. Thus the value of the present (or 
when the ‘now’ is) in one fragment implies there is no fact of the matter about the value of the present 
in another fragment. It will not be necessary to go into all the specific details of this interpretation in 
this paper.
For each fragment, its A-series is perspectival in the sense of (1.1.3). Thus, each moment of A-series 
time in an arbitrarily long sequence has a predecessor. But there is no predecessor to the sequence taken
as a whole (there is no A-series moment after which we have the whole sequence ‘all at once’). This 
avoids the need for an explanation for the whole.
3. Here are two interesting cases involving both the B-series and the A-series.
3.1 the big bang was infinitely earlier than now and finitely far in the past
and
3.2 the big bang was finitely earlier than now and infinitely far in the past
I would argue case (3.2) is more likely than case (3.1). We find the big bang to be 13.8 billion years 
ago. But this leaves open the question of why it didn’t happen a billion years before that such that we 
are also a billion years before now. (These are empirically indistinguishable only on some models of 
time.)
In case (3.2) the number of seconds that the big bang is earlier than now remains at 13.8 billion years. 
But as we go further and further into the past, toward the big bang, we have to go even further into the 
past, i.e. to successively go 1 second earlier in the B-series requires going progressively to a larger and 
larger extent into the past. 
See the appendix for the definition of the rate r. 
For case (3.2) we have r → 0 sec./e
 Quantum systems form distinct fragments. In the Fragmental interpretation of quantum mechanics a 
mutual measurement/observation is given when and only when there is a collapse of the wavefunction
—described by projecting in a Hilbert space. Such a projection updates the value of the rate r. 
This model therefore predicts that as one goes back in time toward the big bang there will be a larger 
and larger number—tending toward an infinity—of quantum interactions per second. If we take the 
speed of light c = 1 m/sec. as a conversion factor, then the closer we get to the big bang the larger the 
number of quantum interactions per 4-volume. This looks like it approaches an infinite temperature at 
the singularity.
4. Conclusion
We give a fragmentalist perspectival possible answer to the question of why there is something rather 
than nothing. We then noted the A-series is perspectival within each fragment. 
This allows us to make sense of the idea that the big bang was 14.8 billion years earlier than now but 
infinitely far in the past. From this we conclude that the number of quantum interactions per unit 4-
volume goes toward infinity as we go toward the singularity. 
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6. Appendix: definitions and rates
Start with a parameter t whose unit is change in B-series, an interval, in for example seconds. Add a
parameter τ whose unit is not an interval in B-series clock time: in AB-theory, τ is the parameter of the
A-series, and “e” will be a unit of temporal becoming (e does not denote electric charge here). Let τ be
the future-present-past spectrum. The idea will be es coordinatize τ the way seconds coordinatize t.
Define an indexical clock to be a clock that's not accelerating, has relative velocity 0 meters-per-
second, and is spatially local, to a centered inertial reference frame, all in terms of a B-series.
Define 
6.1  1 e is what becoming is like for 1 second of indexical clock time
If becoming is indeed phenomenal in the way that qualia are, then, it could be argued, it must be 
'defined' or 'referred to' in this curious 'what it is like' way, on salient views. E.g. a green quale is 
defined as 'what it is like' to experience green. The necessity of doing this has to do with their 
ineffability. e can be well-defined for each τ for a system. Further, a second is well-defined across 
systems such as Alice and a protozoan, even though the protozoan doesn't have the mental capacities 
Alice does. It's plausible that it's the same way with 1 e of A-series time. 
Just the way one can re-define seconds to be longer or shorter than the usual seconds, one can re-define
es to be further or closer into the future (or past) than the usual es. The physically significant stuff 
should be invariant under these changes.
Define  
 
6.2  r sec./e = - d(Alice's B-series)/d(Alice's A-series)
as the change in 1 second of indexical clock time per change in e, for any quantum system Alice (no 
matter how small or non-local), which defines Alice’s fragment. For example, the position of a particle 
at 1 second later than t = 0 is also 1 e closer to the present from the future (or further into the past from 
the present) relative to some event for the ‘flat’ case of AB-spacetime with the obvious coordinitazition.
The minus sign accounts for the fact that increasing B-series times become into the decreasing A-series 
times, assuming positive numbers of e are in the future and negative numbers are in the past.
The countdown to a rocket liftoff, 10… 9… 8… could be seen as counting the number of es. When the 
announcer says ‘10’ this means that the liftoff, if it is going to happen, is 10 e in the future of the 
control center. In the case of ‘flat’  AB-spacetime, in the relevant coordinate system, the liftoff is also 
10 seconds later than the clock-time when the announcer says ‘10’. When the announcer says ‘9’ this 
means the liftoff, if it is going to happen, is 9 e in the future of the control center. However, the 
beginning of the countdown is still 10 seconds earlier than the liftoff—it’s just that 1 second has 
receded 1 e into the past.
We would say ‘3 minutes later than 2 pm’. But, supposing it is now 2 pm, we would not say ‘3 minutes 
in the future of ‘now’’. Instead we would say ‘3 e in the future of ‘now’’.
Consider the rate r = 2 sec./e. This can be interpreted as meaning there are 2 seconds of indexical clock 
time per unit of becoming. That would imply that, for 1 e, 2 seconds go by, so earlier-to-later relations 
would appear to go by faster. This would be like the ‘sped up movie’ metaphor in which time goes by at
twice the usual rate.
Let the rate r be in units of seconds/e. The general idea is then
6.3
r > 1 B-series time appears sped up (earlier-times to later-times appear to be going by faster than 
normal).
r = 1 the change in B-series information per change in A-series information is given by 1 second of 
indexical clock time per unit e of becoming. This unit e is assumed to be applicable to each 
panpsychist system, the way 1 second of indexical clock time is applicable to such systems 
as a macroscopic Alice or a protozoan.  
0 < r < 1    B-series time goes by slowed down.
r = 0 B-series time appears stopped (but the appearance goes on as usual in the A-series)
r < 0 time appears (from future to present to past) to be going backward in B-series time, i.e. later 
times to earlier times, e.g. time-reversal, or watching the movie go backward.
One may define (for example) dr/de which would have something to do with the rate of becoming 
accelerating through the A-series. e-2 would be something like “per unit of becoming, per unit of 
becoming”.
We could consider the difference in the rates of time’s becoming in a general relativistic context. Let 
clock c2 be above the surface of the earth and clock c1 be 1 meter directly above c2. Let c2’s time be 
given by T(τ, t) and c1’s time be give by T'(τ', t'). General relativity tells us that c2 runs slower than c1. 
So
 6.4 dt/dt' < 1 sec./sec.'
Each clock registers that later and later respective times are becoming into their respective presents at a
rate of 1 in their own fragments,
6.5  dt/dτ = 1 sec./e, dt'/dτ' = 1 sec.'/e'      
                 
which allow one to calculate that 
6.6  dt/dτ' < 1 sec./e', dt'/dτ > 1 sec.'/e
     
We could try to compute 
6.7  dT'/dT
except (5.7) treats T' and T functionally equally and therefore with an equal reality, contradicting 
fragmentalism.
Let x be the position of a point particle defined relative to a chosen origin in a particular system. One 
may define dx/dt, the 'rate' at which the position of the particle changes with respect to the B-series 
time t, i. e. with respect to the 'time' going from earlier times to later times, in units of meters/second. 
One may define dx/dτ, the 'rate' at which the position of the particle changes as it 'becomes' from the 
system's future into the system's present and then into the system's past, in units of meters/e. This 
neither assumes nor implies the future is predetermined, as there may be many futures which are 
consistent with the system's present state.
In high school we learn to plot the position x of a classical point-particle as a function of time, i.e. we 
plot x(t). But here t is a B-series. But then we can also plot x(τ) where τ is an A-series. In this latter 
case x(5) means the position x at 5 e in the future (which might be wholly or partially in the present 
given a thick present). x(0.1) means the position x at 0.1 e in the future(/present). x(-2) means the 
position at 2 e in the past(/present). Thus with the more complete notion of time we want to plot x(τ, t), 
or x( T(τ, t) ).
If a clock ‘slows down’ as it falls into a black hole, from our viewpoint, then the rate r = [sec.'/e] 
decreases in magnitude. 
